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THE WATER IS ON FIRE: CURRENT CIRCUIT
APPROACHES TO FEE-SHIFTING IN CITIZEN-SUITS
UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE NEED FOR
CLEARER AND MORE UNIFORM STANDARDS
CHARLES KINLEY*

INTRODUCTION
By the 1970s, water quality in the United States had reached a
breaking point.1 As citizens in Missouri drank water from a muddy river,
others in Ohio watched a river burst into flames.2 At the same time, wetlands were disappearing at an alarming rate, and fish were dying from
pollution by the millions.3 Clearly, something needed to be done.4 In
response to problems such as these, Congress enacted the Clean Water
Act (“CWA”) in 1972 to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”5 However, while water quality
in the United States has improved in the decades since the CWA was enacted, the fight is far from over.6
Unfortunately, federal and state agencies tasked with enforcing
environmental regulations sometimes lack the funding to enforce the law,
fail to spot violations, or simply ignore certain polluters altogether.7 Thus,
*
JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2022; Senior Articles Editor, William & Mary
Environmental Law & Policy Review, Volume 46; BA English and History, University of
Arkansas, 2013, cum laude. The author would like to thank his wife for her continued
support and the members of the ELPR board and staff for all their hard work.
1
Forty Years of the Clean Water Act Mean Much Better Water, MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL
AGENCY [hereinafter MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY], https://web.archive.org/web
/20201112024637/https://www.pca.state.mn.us/about-mpca/forty-years-clean-water-act
-mean-much-better-water [https://perma.cc/UB65-APQF] (last visited Jan. 12, 2022).
2
Id.
3
John Devine, Clean Water Act at 45: Despite Success, It’s Under Attack, NRDC (Oct. 18,
2017), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/jon-devine/clean-water-act-45-despite-success-its-under
-attack#:~:text=Industry%2Dspecific%20discharge%20standards%20now,pre%2DClean
%20Water%20Act%20era [https://perma.cc/2Z47-KC9B].
4
See id.
5
See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2018).
6
See MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, supra note 1; Devine, supra note 3.
7
ENV’T L. INST., A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO USING FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS TO SECURE
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 33–35 (2002), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015
-04/documents/citizen-guide-ej.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YKT-WNEM].
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in spite of the clear goals of the CWA, private companies and individuals
may still get away with pollution.8 As examples of wide-scale drinking
water contamination in New York, Michigan, Ohio, and North Carolina
show, failure to prevent water pollution may have serious consequences
for U.S. citizens.9 It is no wonder that nationwide concern over polluted
drinking water continues to grow.10 Confronted with these environmental
and health threats, average citizens may feel helpless, unable to do anything to protect their communities from disaster.
Fortunately, U.S. citizens may sue any person or government entity
to enforce the requirements of the CWA.11 However, few citizens have the
expertise and resources needed to litigate environmental issues, and these
lawsuits often involve pricey expert witnesses, high discovery costs, and
other necessary expenses associated with litigation.12 Consequently, regardless of how great a citizen’s concern is for the environment, the idea
of an average citizen suing to enforce the CWA out of her own pocket is
likely impractical.13
To help lessen this financial burden, Congress has given courts
the discretion to award litigation costs and attorney fees in CWA citizensuits “to any prevailing or substantially prevailing party, whenever the
court determines such award is appropriate.”14 This fee-shifting provision
allows private citizens to hire qualified attorneys to enforce environmental
regulations without having to pay the price for helping to enact positive
8

For example, regional water boards in California are unable to pursue every CWA
violation because of limited resources. See Reed Sato, Citizen Suit Enforcement Under the
Federal Clean Water Act: A Snapshot of the California Experience Based on Notices of
Intent to Sue, CAL. STATE WATER BD. OFF. OF ENF’T 7 (2011), https://www.waterboards.ca
.gov/water_issues/programs/enforcement/docs/citizen_suits/citizen_suit_report_may20
11.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4UB-G5AE].
9
See Nicole Greenfield, Getting the Lead Out of Yonkers Schools, NRDC (Apr. 2, 2020);
Susan Cosier, Flint’s Lead Crisis, NRDC (Apr. 2, 2020); Jodi Helmer, Wilmington’s Battle
With GenX, a Dangerous Teflon Chemical, NRDC (Apr. 2, 2020); Jodi Helmer, Toledo’s
Blooming Algae Crisis, NRDC (Apr. 2, 2020) (all four articles available at https://www
.turningonthetap.org/#/introduction(summary:1//toledo:1//wilmington:1//flint:1//yonkers:1
[https://perma.cc/DP5R-STZX]).
10
See Justin McCarthy, In U.S., Water Pollution Worries Highest Since 2001, GALLUP
(Mar. 31, 2017), https://news.gallup.com/poll/207536/water-pollution-worries-highest-2001
.aspx [https://perma.cc/JZ4G-CNMM].
11
See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2018).
12
See ENV’T L. INST., supra note 7, at 33–34; Eileen Gauna, Federal Environmental Citizen
Provisions: Obstacles and Incentives on the Road to Environmental Justice, 22 ECOLOGY
L. Q. 1, 79 (1995).
13
See Gauna, supra note 12, at 79.
14
See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d).
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change.15 It also means that Non-Governmental Organizations (“NGOs”),
such as the National Resources Defense Counsel and Sierra Club, may
serve as environmental enforcers on a national scale without losing
hundreds of thousands of dollars on every case.16 With the help of this
financial safety net, the CWA citizen-suit has been an effective tool in
encouraging compliance with environmental regulations.17
However, despite both Congress and public policy favoring CWA
citizen-suits, ambiguous Supreme Court guidance has allowed a decadeslong rift between federal circuits to emerge regarding both how district
courts should exercise their discretion under the fee-shifting provision and
which factors warrant an award.18 While some circuits grant district
courts broad latitude to determine when to award costs and fees, others
only allow courts to grant or deny awards in certain instances.19 Additionally, while some circuits focus solely on whether a party seeking fees
has prevailed, others look to see whether that party has advanced the goals
of the CWA.20 Furthermore, while certain circuits have provided somewhat clear guidance to their lower courts, other appellate courts have remained silent.21 This silence has led to disunity within individual circuits,
as their district courts may be free to adopt differing standards, decline to
follow their own precedent, or fail to explain their reasoning altogether.22
This lack of uniformity both among and within circuits may potentially lead to murky, unpredictable outcomes, impose greater litigation
risks, create uncertainty for both plaintiff and defendant, and possibly
undermine the ability of citizens and NGOs to enforce environmental
regulations.23 Thus, until the Supreme Court provides clarification and
a clearer standard for courts to follow, federal circuit courts need to step

15

See ENV’T L. INST., supra note 7, at 34; Karl S. Coplan, Citizen Litigants Citizen Regulators: Four Cases Where Citizen Suits Drove Development of Clean Water Law, 25 COLO.
NAT. RES. ENERGY & ENV’T. L. REV. 61, 72 (2011) (“[T]he relative ease of proof of the CWA
case and the availability of attorney’s fees to prevailing plaintiffs . . . create[s] an effective, self-funded citizen enforcement mechanism.”).
16
See James T. Lang, Citizens’ Environmental Lawsuits, 47 TEX. ENV’T L.J. 17, 22 (2017).
17
See Robins Kundis Craig, Constitutional Environmental Law, or, the Constitutional
Consequences of Insisting that the Environment Is Everybody’s Business, 49 ENV’T L. 703,
724 (2019).
18
See infra Part III.
19
See infra Part III.
20
See infra Part III.
21
See infra Part III.
22
See infra Part III.
23
See infra Sections IV.A–B.
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in and give their lower courts more tangible guidance, rather than letting
discretion run wild.
This Note will start by providing a short explanation of the origins
of and congressional goals for the fee-shifting provision in the CWA.24 It
will then offer a brief summary of how Supreme Court precedent has
both clarified and confused this issue.25 Then, it will dive into an examination of how the different circuits and their district courts have interpreted the CWA’s fee-shifting provision and how these interpretations
have struggled with past Supreme Court decisions.26 Finally, this Note
will explore the costs and benefits associated with these fee-shifting standards and offer a potential solution to this problem.27 Ultimately, this Note
will argue that, in the absence of Supreme Court guidance, the circuits
must adopt clearer, more uniform standards in order to fulfill congressional objectives, bolster the viability of CWA citizen-suits, and ensure that
citizens do not pay the price for their public service.28
I.

PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT AND FEE-SHIFTING UNDER THE CWA
CITIZEN-SUIT: ORIGIN, GOALS, AND PRECEDENT

Considering the environmental crises Congress faced in the early
1970s, its initial goal that “the discharge of pollutants into the navigable
waters be eliminated by 1985” may have been a bit impractical.29 Thus,
it makes sense why Congress would amend the CWA in 1972 to include a
citizen-suit provision that “provide[d] citizen participation in the enforcement of control requirements and regulations,” as it had done with the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970.30 This provision would allow a
citizen to sue any individual or government agency for violating the CWA
and bring actions against the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
Administrator for failing to perform required duties.31
Private enforcement regimes, such as the CWA’s citizen-suit provision, can benefit society by expanding government resources, shifting the

24

See infra Part I.
See infra Parts I–II.
26
See infra Part III.
27
See infra Part IV.
28
See infra Part IV.
29
See MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, supra note 1; Devine, supra note 3; 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(1) (2018).
30
See S. REP. No. 92-414, at 79 (1971).
31
Id. at 80–81.
25
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costs of regulation, encouraging judicial innovation, and providing more
eyes on the ground to detect violations.32 However, allowing private
enforcement may also lead to an excess of judicial policymaking, create
inconsistency and disunity among courts, and discourage cooperation and
voluntary compliance with regulators.33 Additionally, it may open the door
for self-serving plaintiffs and their lawyers to take advantage of their
enforcement power for their own gain.34
Furthermore, for a private enforcement regime to thrive, citizens
need an economic incentive.35 Fee shifting provides such an incentive by
allowing successful litigants to recover litigation costs and attorney
fees.36 In the context of environmental regulation, which is often costly,
complicated, and time-consuming, this incentive is crucial to private
enforcement.37
Congress recognized both the potential for abuse and the need for
financial incentive, and so it proposed a fee-shifting provision to accompany
citizen-suits.38 To prevent frivolous or harassing lawsuits, Congress
would give courts the discretion to award attorney’s fees and costs of
litigation “whenever the court determines that such action is in the
public interest.”39 This would permit a court to “award costs of litigation
to defendants where the litigation was obviously frivolous or harassing.”40
At the same time, Congress recognized that “in bringing legitimate actions
under this section citizens would be performing a public service.”41 Thus,
this provision would also allow a court to “award costs of litigation to
such party.”42
To further encourage public service, Congress intended that these
awards would “extend to plaintiffs in actions which result in successful
abatement but do not reach a verdict.”43 For example, if a citizen-suit
prompted a defendant to stop violating the CWA before a verdict was
32

See Stephen B. Burbank et al., Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 662
(2013).
33
Id. at 667–69.
34
Id. at 670.
35
Id. at 675.
36
Id. at 675–76.
37
See Lang, supra note 16, at 22.
38
S. REP. No. 92-414, at 81 (1971).
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
See id.
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issued, the court could still award costs and fees to that plaintiff.44 Thus,
as enacted in 1972, Section 505(d) of the CWA gave courts the discretion
to “award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert
witness fees) to any party, whenever the court determines such award is
appropriate.”45
Unfortunately, by using the word “appropriate,” Congress may
have been too vague. The Supreme Court recognized this lack of clarity
in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, where it noted the difficulty in “draw[ing]
any meaningful guidance from [a statute’s] use of the word ‘appropriate,’
which means only ‘specially suitable: fit, proper.’”46 In that case, the
Court analyzed Section 307(f) of the Clean Air Act and concluded that
“appropriate” “modifies but does not completely reject the traditional rule
that a fee claimant must ‘prevail’ before it may recover attorney’s fees.”47
The Court explained that the purpose of the “when appropriate” standard
was to “permit awards of fees to all partially prevailing parties.”48 However, “absent some degree of success on the merits by the claimant, it is
not ‘appropriate’” to award fees.49 Furthermore, the Court stated that its
interpretation of “appropriate” in that case controlled the construction of
the term in other statutes using identical language, including Section
505(d) of the CWA.50
After Ruckelshaus, Congress amended Section 505(d) to clarify
when courts may award costs and fees.51 Based on the premise that it is
unreasonable and inappropriate “to compel either the government or a
private party to pay the costs of an opposing party to a lawsuit when the
opposing party has not prevailed on the issues,” Congress decided to limit
awards to only “prevailing or substantially prevailing parties.”52 However, the amendment was “not intended to preclude the awarding of costs
to a partially prevailing party with respect to the issues on which that
party has prevailed, if such an award is deemed appropriate by the court,”
nor was it intended to preclude a party that has achieved a successful
settlement from obtaining a fee award.53 Rather, the purpose of adding
44

S. REP. No. 92-414, at 81 (1971).
Pub. L. No. 92-500, tit. V, § 505(d), 86 Stat. 889 (1972).
46
See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 683 (1983).
47
Id. at 686.
48
Id. at 691.
49
Id. at 694.
50
Id. at 682–83 n.1.
51
See S. REP. No. 99-50, at 33 (1985).
52
Id.
53
Id.
45
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the new language was to exclude superfluous parties, such as “a party who
intervenes in a case and, although technically on the prevailing side, fails
to make a substantial contribution to the successful outcome of the case.”54
Consequently, as amended in 1987, Section 505(d) provides that, in its final
order, a court “may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney
and expert witness fees) to any prevailing or substantially prevailing party,
whenever the court determines such award is appropriate.”55
II.

CURRENT STANDARDS FOR PREVAILING OR SUBSTANTIALLY
PREVAILING PARTY STATUS

For prevailing defendants, a court deciding whether to award
costs and fees under the CWA typically applies the Supreme Court’s
Christiansburg Garment standard.56 Under this standard, a court may
only award costs and fees to a prevailing defendant if the defendant shows
that the plaintiff’s claim was “frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or
that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.”57 For a
defendant seeking an award under this standard, the burden may be
quite high.58
For plaintiffs, however, the standard is less strict because “the
plaintiff is the chosen instrument of Congress to vindicate ‘a policy that
Congress considered of the highest priority,’” and an award to a prevailing plaintiff is “against a violator of federal law.”59 Courts have generally
recognized prevailing party status when a party has: (1) obtained “a

54

Id.
33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2018).
56
See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, 434 U.S. 412,
422 (1978).
57
See, e.g., Sierra Club v. City of Little Rock, 351 F.3d 840, 847 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding
district court’s denial of fees to defendants proper when plaintiff’s claims not “frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation”); Razore v. Tulalip Tribes, 66 F.3d 236, 240 (9th
Cir. 1995) (holding Christiansburg Garment standard applies to CWA fee awards and
denying award to defendant because plaintiffs’ arguments were not “not frivolous or
unreasonable”); City of Highland Park v. EPA, No. 2:16-cv-13840, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
141030, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 6, 2020) (awarding defendants fees when plaintiff’s claims
were “completely groundless and frivolous”).
58
See, e.g., Del. Riverkeeper Network v. Sunoco Pipeline L.P., No. 18-2447, 2020 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 174494, at *13–15 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2020) (denying defendant’s request for
an award despite the plaintiffs “litigat[ing] in a questionable manner”).
59
Christiansburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 418 (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters.,
Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)).
55
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favorable final judicial order on the merits”; (2) secured a consent decree;
or (3) reached a private settlement.60 In some instances, a party may
qualify as “prevailing” under the “catalyst theory,” which essentially
requires plaintiffs to show that “(1) the lawsuit stated a genuine claim,
(2) the lawsuit was a ‘substantial’ or ‘significant’ cause in the defendant’s
decision to voluntarily change its conduct, and (3) defendant provided
some of the benefit sought by the lawsuit.”61 However, based on unclear
Supreme Court precedent, circuit courts, and sometimes even their own
district courts, disagree as to whether the catalyst theory still applies to
CWA awards.62
The Supreme Court has interpreted “prevailing party” to mean
“one who has been awarded some relief by the court.”63 In Buckhannon,
the Court decided a case involving attorney fees under the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988 (“FHAA”) and the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (“ADA”).64 The Court rejected the catalyst theory.65 Rather,
the Court held that “prevailing party” does not include a party “that has
failed to secure a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree,” despite “achiev[ing] the desired result” and bringing about “a voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct.”66 The Court held that to prevail,
a party must “receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim.”67
There must be a judicially sanctioned (judicial imprimatur) “‘material
alteration of the legal relationship of the parties’ necessary to permit an
award of attorney’s fees,” such as by an enforceable judgment on the
merits or court-ordered consent decree.68
There are numerous problems that could result from the inapplicability of the catalyst theory to environmental citizen-suits, including:
(1) permitting agencies and corporations to avoid consequences for violating the law by merely complying once the violation is discovered (thus

60

Jason Douglass Klein, Attorney’s Fees and the Clean Water Act after Buckhannon, 9
HASTINGS W.-NW J. ENV’T L. & POL’Y 109, 109–10 (2003).
61
Id. at 109.
62
See infra Part III.
63
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W.Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598,
603 (2001).
64
Id. at 600–01.
65
See id. at 601.
66
Id. at 600.
67
Id. at 603 (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987)).
68
Id. at 604–05 (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S.
782, 792–93 (1989)).
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making the case moot); (2) allowing violators to voluntarily comply once
a lawsuit looks unfavorable; (3) placing undue risk on those seeking to
enforce environmental laws; and (4) potentially discouraging settlements
(if rejection of the theory is taken too far).69 Some, looking to congressional intent and the actual language of the statute, have concluded that
Buckhannon may not apply to the CWA.70 Others, including some courts,
are unsure.71 Still others, notably the Fourth Circuit, have shied away
from deciding this issue.72
A potential clarification came in Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life
Insurance Co., where the Supreme Court made a distinction between
statutes that permit a court to award fees only to a “prevailing party” and
statutes that authorize courts to grant fee awards to “substantially prevailing” parties.73 The Court held that its “prevailing party” precedents
“do not govern the availability of fees awards under [a provision that]
does not limit the availability of attorney’s fees to the ‘prevailing party.’”74
Although this suggests that Buckhannon may not apply to the CWA,
many courts still refuse to apply the catalyst theory based on the holding
in Buckhannon.75
In light of congressional intent, inclusion of “whenever . . . appropriate” terminology, Buckhannon’s debatable prohibition on applying the
catalyst standard, and Hardt’s distinction between “prevailing” and
“substantially prevailing” statutes, circuits have differed in the standards they use to determine whether to award costs and fees in citizensuits brought under the CWA.76 These differing standards have led to a
circuit split (and sometimes even splits within circuits) that may threaten
to undermine Congress’s goal to “restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”77
69

Klein, supra note 60, at 109–10.
Id. at 116.
71
See, e.g., Ailor v. City of Maynardville, 368 F.3d 587, 601 n.6 (6th Cir. 2004) (“It is an
open question whether the catalyst theory remains viable in the context of environmental
statutes like the CWA”).
72
See, e.g., Sanitary Bd. of Charleston v. Wheeler, No. 18-2385, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS
112, at *7–8, *10 (4th Cir. Apr. 9, 2020) (declining to decide whether catalyst theory still
applies to CWA).
73
Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co., 560 U.S. 242, 253 (2010).
74
Id. (citations omitted).
75
See, e.g., Sierra Club v. City of Little Rock, 351 F.3d 840, 845–47 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding
that, under Buckhannon, “the change in the relationship must be ‘judicially sanctioned.’”).
76
See infra Part III.
77
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2018); see infra Part III.
70
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DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO THE CWA FEE-SHIFTING PROVISION

When considering whether to award costs and fees to a plaintiff in
a CWA citizen-suit, a district court must decide two things: (1) whether
the party seeking an award is a “prevailing or substantially prevailing
party”; and (2) whether an award is “appropriate.”78 However, the circuits
differ in which of these two determinations they focus on and may apply
different standards to determine both “prevailing or substantially prevailing party” status and appropriateness.79 These different standards
often turn on the amount of district court discretion allowed within the
particular circuit.80
Generally, there are three main approaches circuits take regarding a district court’s discretion to award costs and fees to a prevailing
party.81 Some circuits provide little guidance to their lower courts and
instead give them broad latitude in determining awards.82 For example,
the First Circuit gives district courts “wide discretion” to consider a variety
of factors in determining whether to grant or deny an award.83 Similarly,
the Third Circuit places no restrictions on a district court’s discretion as
long as the party seeking the award is “prevailing or substantially prevailing.”84 The Eighth Circuit takes a similar approach by focusing on
whether the party is truly “prevailing or substantially prevailing.”85 The
Second Circuit takes this approach as well.86
Other circuits provide more guidance and only allow their lower
courts to exercise narrow discretion.87 One example is the Fourth Circuit,
which directs courts within its jurisdiction to limit their focus to determining whether the party seeking an award has advanced the goals of the
78

St. John’s Organic Farm v. Gem Cnty. Mosquito Abatement Dist., 574 F.3d 1054, 1058
(9th Cir. 2009).
79
See infra Sections III.A–C.
80
See infra Sections III.A–C.
81
See infra Sections III.A–C.
82
See infra Section III.A.
83
See United States v. Comunidades Unidas Contra la Contaminacion, 204 F.3d 275, 283
(1st Cir. 2000).
84
See Penn. Env’t Def. Found. v. Canon-McMillan Sch. Dist., 152 F.3d 228, 231 (3d Cir.
1998).
85
See Sierra Club v. City of Little Rock, 351 F.3d 840, 844 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing
Armstrong v. ASARCO, Inc., 138 F.3d 382, 388 (8th Cir. 1998)).
86
See Friends of the Earth v. Eastman Kodak Co., 834 F.2d 295, 297 (2d Cir. 1987); Student
Pub. Int. Rsch. Grp., Inc. v. Anchor Thread Co., No. 84-320(GEB), 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4348, at *4–5 (D.N.J. May 12, 1988); Penn. Env’t Def. Found. v. Packaging Corp. of
America, No. 87-4739, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 380, at *6–7 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 1989).
87
See infra Section III.B.
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CWA.88 However, despite this goal-oriented approach, in practice, courts
in this jurisdiction sometimes focus purely on party status instead.89
Finally, some circuits provide greater guidance and greatly limit
their district courts’ discretion.90 For example, the Eleventh Circuit only
permits district courts to deny costs and fees upon showing of “good
cause.”91 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit requires “special circumstances” to
deny these awards.92
Within each of these general categories, the approaches vary by
93
circuit. Indeed, even within a particular circuit, district courts may differ
in their analyses.94 While each approach may have its benefits, this lack
of uniformity among and within circuits has the potential to undermine
the CWA citizen-suit by adding confusion, unpredictability, and risk, all
of which may deter plaintiffs from suing under the CWA. In the absence of
a clear standard from the Supreme Court, a clearer, more uniform approach among the circuits would benefit both those who bring citizen-suits
and the district courts tasked with making fee-award determinations.
A.

Approach One: Broad Latitude

1.

Wide Discretion in the First Circuit

The First Circuit, relying on Ruckelshaus, has held that the term
“appropriate” grants district courts “wide discretion . . . to weigh against
88
See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Hanson, 859 F.2d 313, 315, 317 (4th Cir. 1988); Stoddard v.
W. Carolina Reg’l Sewer Auth., 784 F.2d 1200, 1209 (4th Cir. 1986). The Federal Circuit
also focuses on the CWA’s goals in determining the appropriateness of cost and fee
awards. See Sierra Club v. EPA, 769 F.2d 796, 800 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding “the party
must have served the public interest by assisting in the proper implementation of the
statute”); Nat’l Res. Def. Council v. Adm’r, EPA, 595 F. Supp. 65, 70 (D.D.C. 1984)
(denying fees award to plaintiffs fees against private, defendant intervenors because
intervenors “helped further the goals of the [Clean Water] Act” and intervenors should
not be “punish[ed] . . . for attempting to enforce their, non-frivolous view of the Act.”).
89
See Sanitary Bd. of Charleston v. Pruitt, 336 F. Supp. 3d 615, 619 (S.D.W. Va. 2018),
aff’d sub nom. Sanitary Bd. of Charleston v. Wheeler, No. 18-2385, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS
112, at *1 (4th Cir. Apr. 9, 2020); Ohio Valley Env’t Coal., Inc. v. Wheeler, 387 F. Supp.
3d 654, 658 n.3 (S.D.W. Va. 2019).
90
See infra Section III.C.
91
See Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128, 1143 (11th Cir. 1990)
(citing Stoddard v. W. Carolina Reg’l Sewer Auth., 784 F.2d 1200, 1209 (4th Cir. 1986)).
92
See St. John’s Organic Farm v. Gem Cnty. Mosquito Abatement Dist., 574 F.3d 1054, 1062
(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)).
93
See infra Sections III.A–C.
94
See infra Section III.B.1.
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the total background the significance of any contributions and the appropriateness of any award of fees and costs.”95 Due to this wide discretion,
a district court may choose which factors it deems relevant in determining whether to grant an award, and sometimes these factors are clearly
in line with the goals of the CWA citizen-suit provision.96 However, some
courts fail to articulate which factors they find persuasive,97 which may
leave potential citizen-plaintiffs with a sense of uncertainty and a feeling
of helplessness in the face of a particular district court’s whims.
On appeal, the First Circuit provides little guidance, as exemplified in Paolino v. JF Realty, LLC, where that court affirmed a district
court’s fee award to a prevailing defendant based merely on the district
court’s “carefully detailed . . . analysis and the underlying factual basis
for its conclusion,” rather than on a particular standard.98 In that case,
the citizen-plaintiffs sued the defendants for discharging contaminated
water without a state permit, even though they were aware that the
defendants had already installed a comprehensive stormwater management system to remedy the problem.99 The district court justified the
award by explaining that the plaintiffs’ claim, while initially valid, was,
by that point, unreasonable, groundless, and “wholly inconsistent with
a citizen plaintiff who legitimately seeks to prosecute violations of the
CWA for the public good.”100
That case shows that a district court with wide discretion may
base its decision on CWA goals. However, by declining to endorse any
specific factor warranting a fee award, the First Circuit may leave future
citizen-plaintiffs and their defendants without substantive guidance on
which to rely. With such wide discretion, potential plaintiffs are seemingly left at the mercy of the particular district judge deciding the case.

95

See United States v. Comunidades Unidas Contra la Contaminacion, 204 F.3d 275, 283
(1st Cir. 2000) (relying on the Court’s definition of “appropriate” in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra
Club, 463 U.S. 680, 682–83 (1983)).
96
See, e.g., U.S. Pub. Int. Rsch. Grp. v. Stolt Sea Farming, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 2d 46, 48,
50–51 (D. Me. 2004) (holding award of costs and attorney fees appropriate when plaintiffs
“achieved a high measure of success,” “vindicated an important societal interest in protecting . . . a key purpose of the Clean Water Act,” and “established a legal precedent that
can be expected to have a powerful deterrent effect”).
97
See, e.g., Conservation L. Found., Inc. v. Roland Teiner Co., 832 F. Supp. 2d 102, 104
(D. Mass. 2011) (granting motion for attorneys’ fees after default judgment because
plaintiff “prevailed on its claims.”).
98
Paolino v. JF Realty, LLC, 830 F.3d 8, 17–18 (1st Cir. 2016).
99
Id. at 10–13, 17.
100
Id. at 17–18.
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“No Restriction” in the Third Circuit

The Third Circuit has held that the CWA’s citizen-suit provision
“places no restriction on the award other than that the party entitled to the
award be ‘prevailing or substantially prevailing.’”101 This circuit seemingly ignores an “appropriateness” analysis altogether and merely asks
whether the party is prevailing and focuses on whether the lower court
“employs correct standards and procedures and makes findings of fact
not clearly erroneous” when it calculates the award.102 Like the First
Circuit, the Third Circuit fails to provide clear guidance to its lower courts,
and this could potentially leave parties to citizen-suits guessing as to
whether they will pay the price for their own public service.
3.

“Broad” Discretion in the Eighth Circuit

In the Eighth Circuit, an award is “not automatic but rather is
subject to the district court’s discretion.”103 If a district court properly
considers a prevailing party’s motion, then it alone has the “broad discretion” to determine whether to award or deny fees and costs.104 However,
the catalyst theory does not apply in this circuit, and a district court’s
discretion may only be exercised after first applying a strict “prevailing
or substantially prevailing party” analysis.105
For example, in Sierra Club v. City of Little Rock, the Eighth Circuit
adopted Buckhannon’s prohibition on using the catalyst theory to determine prevailing party status and reversed a plaintiff’s fee award.106 In that
case, the Sierra Club sued Little Rock and its Sanitary Sewer Committee
for allowing untreated sewage to overflow into rivers and streams.107
101

See Pa. Env’t Def. Found. v. Canon-McMillan Sch. Dist., 152 F.3d 228, 231 (3d Cir. 1998).
See id. at 232 (citing Pub. Int. Rsch. Grp. v. Windall, 51 F.3d 1179, 1184 (3d Cir. 1995))
(citation omitted).
103
See Citizens Legal Env’t Action Network, Inc. v. Premium Std. Farms, Inc., 397 F.3d
592, 594 (8th Cir. 2005).
104
See Jones v. St. Clair, 804 F.2d 478, 481–82 (8th Cir. 1986) (explaining “we express no
view as to whether the court should award costs and fees. We merely direct the court to
exercise its discretion”).
105
See, e.g., River Ravine Rescue, Inc. v. City of S. St. Paul, No. 03-880 (JNE/JGL), 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12988, at *10 (D. Minn. July 9, 2004) (denying attorney fees because
plaintiff was not prevailing party when defendant obtained permit after plaintiff sued).
106
See Sierra Club v. City of Little Rock, 351 F.3d 840, 845–47 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W.Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598,
604–06 (2001)).
107
Id. at 843.
102
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After the Committee settled, the Sierra Club sought a declaration that
Little Rock was violating the CWA and asked for an injunction requiring
the city to comply with its National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (“NPDES”) permit.108 The district court granted the declaratory
judgment but denied the injunction, reasoning that Little Rock would
likely cooperate with the Sewer Committee under the settlement agreement, which it did.109 However, the court still awarded the Sierra Club
a percentage of its fees.110
The Eighth Circuit reversed this award because the declaratory
judgment did not “materially alter[] the legal relationship between the
parties by modifying [Little Rock’s] behavior in a way that directly benefit[ed] [the Sierra Club].”111 Furthermore, because Little Rock was not a
party to the settlement, its behavior was voluntary rather than “judicially sanctioned.”112 Thus, the Sierra Club was not a prevailing party,
and it was therefore improper for the district court to award fees.113
As that case illustrates, a higher bar for “prevailing or substantially
prevailing party” status (via rejection of the catalyst theory) may make
citizen-suits riskier, as a defendant’s voluntary compliance during litigation
could leave the citizen-plaintiff picking up the tab for their public service.
While a court may potentially use this higher bar to deny awards to
undeserving plaintiffs with moot or frivolous claims, this strict standard
may also undermine Congress’s goal to reward plaintiffs for causing
defendants to cease violating the CWA, even if no verdict is reached.114
Once a party has passed this “prevailing or substantially prevailing” hurdle, however, a court in the Eight Circuit may then exercise its
discretion to determine whether the award is “appropriate.”115 In making
this determination, a lower court may consider whether the party seeking the award has furthered the goals of the CWA.116 However, due to the
lack of clear guidance from above, district courts are given the freedom
108

Id.
Id. at 844, 846.
110
Id. at 844.
111
Id. at 847 (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 106, 111–12 (1992)).
112
Sierra Club, 351 F.3d at 845 (citing Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W.Va. Dep’t of
Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001)).
113
Id. at 844–46.
114
See S. REP. No. 92-414, at 81 (1971).
115
See NICCW v. AgriProcessors, Inc., No. 04-CV-1037-LRR, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
41353, at *26–30 (N.D. Iowa June 6, 2007).
116
See, e.g., Iowa League of Cities v. EPA, 711 F.3d 844, 878 n.20 (8th Cir. 2013) (declining
to award fees despite plaintiff technically being a prevailing party because plaintiff “was
largely vindicating its own rights, rather than the purposes of the CWA.”).
109
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to formulate their own standards. For example, one district court decided
that the catalyst theory, while no longer applicable to determining party
status, may still be used to determine whether an award is “appropriate.”117 Like the First and Third Circuits, district courts in the Eighth
Circuit are largely left to fend for themselves, and citizens bringing claims
in this circuit may face a sea of uncertainty regarding whether they or
their adversary will pay for the litigation once the dust has cleared.
4.

Analysis of Approach One

In each of the above circuits, appellate courts give their district
courts a great deal of discretion to determine which factors to consider
when granting or denying awards.118 While this freedom may allow district courts to make fact- and party-specific determinations, which may
be beneficial in certain instances, it may also contribute to a disunified and
unpredictable body of law both between and within the circuits. Ultimately, potential parties to citizen-suits are likely left with little certainty
as to who will pick up the tab. This has potential to discourage citizen-suit
litigation and, in turn, may allow for unchecked violations of the CWA.
Besides this uncertainty, courts that place too much emphasis on
party status may unfairly deny awards to deserving plaintiffs. Congress’s
goal in imposing the “prevailing or substantially prevailing” party limitation was to prevent an intervening party that, “although technically on
the prevailing side, fails to make a substantial contribution to the successful outcome of the case.”119 Focusing too heavily on party status and
declining to apply the catalyst theory may undermine the overall purpose
of the fee-shifting provision to encourage citizens to “perform[] a public
service” by “bringing legitimate actions.”120
B.

Approach Two: Narrow Discretion

1.

The Fourth Circuit’s Goal-Oriented Approach

In determining whether it is appropriate to award costs and attorney fees to a prevailing party, the Fourth Circuit and its district courts
117

See NICCW v. AgriProcessors, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41353 at *27–30 (recognizing
that “there is little explicit judicial exposition of the standards that the court must apply
in exercising [fee-award] discretion” but determining that the Eighth Circuit “apparently”
applies the catalyst theory to the “whenever . . . appropriate” clause.).
118
See supra Sections III.A.1–3.
119
S. REP. No. 99-50, at 33 (1985).
120
S. REP. No. 92-414, at 81 (1971).
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have primarily focused on whether the party has furthered the goals of
the CWA.121 This focus on CWA goals may also influence a district court’s
determination of prevailing party status.122 However, district courts in
this circuit may focus too heavily on prevailing party status and award or
deny fees without explaining why an award is or is not appropriate.123
Additionally, post-Buckhannon, the Fourth Circuit may apply a heightened standard for prevailing party status.124
For example, in Sanitary Board of Charleston v. Pruitt, the district
court explicitly held that, in light of Buckhannon, the catalyst theory does
not apply to the CWA, and it therefore denied the plaintiff’s fee award.125
However, rather than affirm or refute this reasoning, the Fourth Circuit
instead declined to decide whether the catalyst theory still applied.126
Rather, it merely affirmed on the basis that, even if the catalyst theory
did apply, attorney’s fees would still be inappropriate.127
By failing to decide whether the catalyst theory remains applicable,
the Fourth Circuit opened the door for unpredictability, as exemplified
when the same district court later refused to follow its previous decision
121

See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Hanson, 859 F.2d 313, 315, 317 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding
attorney fee award appropriate when plaintiff “served a key purpose of the citizen-suit
provision . . . [by] ensur[ing] that the agencies fulfill their duties under the CWA
responsibly”). See also Stoddard v. W. Carolina Reg’l Sewer Auth., 784 F.2d 1200, 1209
(4th Cir. 1986) (holding awarding fees appropriate when plaintiffs “actions will tend to
ensure compliance with the Act . . . [and] have served the public interest by insisting that
the Clean Water Act be adequately enforced”) (citations omitted). The Fifth Circuit has
taken a similar approach. See Chemical Mfr. Ass’n v. EPA, 885 F.2d 1276, 1279 (5th Cir.
1989) (holding that “an award is usually ‘appropriate’ when a party has advanced the goals
of the statute invoked in the litigation”); Kleinman v. City of Austin, No. 1:15-CV-497-RP,
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106346, at *3 (W.D. Tex. June 26, 2018) (finding award appropriate
when plaintiff “secured a civil penalty that may deter future [sand and rock] discharges).
122
See, e.g., S. Appalachian Mt. Stewards v. A & G Coal Corp., No. 2:12CV00009, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140207, at *4 (W.D. Va. Oct. 2, 2014) (explaining that “[t]he key factor
[in determining prevailing party status] is whether the plaintiffs ‘advanced the goals of
the [CWA]’”) (citation omitted).
123
See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., No. 2:15-cv-112-JAG, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 220178, at *3–4 (E.D. Va. Dec. 12, 2017) (explaining that a court only “considers
two factors: first, whether the party seeking fees is the prevailing party, and second,
whether the fees requested are reasonable”) (citation omitted).
124
See Sanitary Bd. of Charleston v. Pruitt, 336 F. Supp. 3d 615, 618–19 (S.D.W. Va. 2018),
aff’d sub nom. Sanitary Bd. of Charleston v. Wheeler, No. 18-2385, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS
11235, at *1 (4th Cir. Apr. 9, 2020).
125
See id.
126
See Sanitary Bd. of Charleston v. Wheeler, No. 18-2385, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 11235,
at *7–8, *10 (4th Cir. Apr. 9, 2020).
127
See id.
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and instead applied the catalyst theory, citing the distinction between
“prevailing party” and “substantially prevailing party” statutes identified
in Hardt.128 “[R]egardless of the ultimate disposition of the case,” that court
explained, in the Fourth Circuit, “a party sufficiently prevails under the
CWA when its suit causes an agency to perform a required function and advances the goals of the CWA.”129 It emphasized the Fourth Circuit’s overall
focus on advancing the CWA’s goals as justification for its holding.130
2.

The Second Circuit’s Success-Oriented Approach

The Second Circuit has held that “a favorable settlement is sufficient by itself to support an award of attorney’s fees without any adjudication or admission of liability.”131 However, post-Buckhannon, district
courts in this circuit no longer apply the catalyst theory.132 But, rather
than apply a clear standard, these courts focus purely on the success of
the plaintiff seeking the award.133 This narrow focus on success seems to
shift the focus away from rewarding public service. When combined with
a rejection of the catalyst theory, this approach likely discourages citizens
from suing, as a plaintiff runs the risk that her defendant may escape
paying litigation costs by voluntarily complying before a settlement or
verdict is reached.
3.

Analysis of Approach Two

The Fourth Circuit’s narrow-discretion approach illustrates that
merely articulating a goal-oriented approach without providing a specific
128

See Ohio Valley Env’t Coal., Inc. v. Wheeler, 387 F. Supp. 3d 654, 658 n.3 (S.D.W. Va.
2019) (citing Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co., 560 U.S. 242, 253 (2010)).
129
Id. at 659–60.
130
See id. at 660–61 (citing S. All. for Clean Energy v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, 650
F.3d 401, 406–07 (4th Cir. 2011)) (citations omitted).
131
Friends of the Earth v. Eastman Kodak Co., 834 F.2d 295, 297 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing
McCann v. Coughlin, 698 F.2d 112, 128 (2d Cir. 1983)).
132
See, e.g., Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. HVFG, LLC, No. 06 CV 6829 (HB), 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 85422, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2010) (requiring “judicially sanctioned”
change between parties before awarding costs and fees).
133
See, e.g., Student Pub. Int. Rsch. Grp., Inc. v. Anchor Thread Co., No. 84-320(GEB),
1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4348, at *5 (D.N.J. May 12, 1988) (holding “‘some success’ [by
plaintiffs] sufficient to entitle them to an award of attorneys’ fees”) (citing Friends of the
Earth v. Eastman Kodak Co., 834 F.2d at 297); Penn. Env’t Def. Found. v. Packaging Corp.
of Am., No. 87-4739, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 380, at *6–7 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 1989) (holding
award of attorneys’ fees “appropriate” because plaintiff obtained “some of the benefit sought
and . . . the relief obtained was causally related to the prosecution of the complaint”).
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standard for determining “prevailing or substantially prevailing” party
status may leave little for district courts to work with. Furthermore,
because this appellate court has declined to decide whether the catalyst
theory applies, district courts in this circuit are left basing award determinations on their own judgment and may be free to reach seemingly
contradictory conclusions.134 This may deter future public servants from
bringing their claims by leaving them with little indication as to who will
end up paying for environmental enforcement. Similarly, the Second Circuit’s even narrower approach of requiring plaintiffs to achieve elevated,
post-Buckhannon success may also discourage public service by heightening the risk of suing powerful defendants.
C.

Approach Three: Limited Discretion

1.

The Eleventh Circuit’s “Good Cause” Standard

Similar to the Fourth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit has held that
“an award of attorneys’ fees in a Clean Water Act suit is appropriate when
the moving party has advanced the goals of the Act.”135 However, this circuit has explicitly stated that its lower courts may grant awards “to
plaintiffs who do not obtain court-ordered relief but whose suit has a
positive catalytic effect.”136 The requirement of a “positive” catalytic effect
means that the change prompted by the plaintiff’s suit must be tied to a
successful outcome for that plaintiff.137
Although that circuit acknowledges that awarding costs and fees is
not mandatory, it has held that “the sound exercise of [a district court’s]
discretion will not allow the court to deny fees and costs absent good
cause.”138 Examples of “good cause” denial of prevailing parties’ awards
134

See Ohio Valley Env’t Coal., Inc. v. Wheeler, 387 F. Supp. 3d 654, 658 n.3 (S.D.W. Va.
2019); Sanitary Bd. of Charleston v. Pruitt, 336 F. Supp. 3d 615, 618–19 (S.D.W. Va. 2018).
135
Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 678 F.3d 1199, 1202 (11th Cir.
2012) (citing Chemical Mfr. Ass’n v. EPA, 885 F.2d 1276, 1279 (5th Cir. 1989)).
136
Id. (citing Loggerhead Turtle v. City Counsel, 307 F.3d 1318, 1326 (11th Cir. 2002))
(citation omitted). See also Black Warrior Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Metro Recycling Inc., No.
14-14800, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 9233, at *1, *3 (11th Cir. June 3, 2015) (holding “prevailing
or substantially prevailing” party is one who “advanced the goals of the [Clean Water]
Act” and reaffirming viability of catalyst theory in CWA cases) (citations omitted).
137
See Friends of the Everglades, 678 F.3d at 1202 (holding that plaintiff causing EPA to
promulgate new rules adverse to the plaintiff’s position was not “what was intended by
the idea that a law suit has a positive catalytic effect”).
138
Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128, 1143 (11th Cir.
1990) (citing Stoddard v. W. Carolina Reg’l Sewer Auth., 784 F.2d 1200, 1209 (4th Cir.
1986)) (ordering district court to award fees when plaintiff was prevailing party because

2022]

THE WATER IS ON FIRE

539

often concern the connection between the party’s actions in the litigation
and the goals of the CWA.139
As cases in this circuit illustrate, by explicitly resolving the catalysttheory question (though modifying it to a certain extent) and articulating
a workable standard, district courts in the Eleventh Circuit may be better
equipped to make more uniform, predictable decisions regarding fee
awards. In turn, potential parties to citizen-suits will likely have a better
idea as to whether they will receive or pay attorney’s fees and costs.
2.

The Ninth Circuit’s “Special Circumstances” Standard

In St. John’s Organic Farm v. Gem County Mosquito Abatement
District, the Ninth Circuit held that a district court may not deny attorney fees to the prevailing party in a CWA case unless there are “special
circumstances” that would make granting an award unjust.140 Although
this “special circumstances” standard was originally only applied in suits
brought under the Civil Rights Act, the court explained that the Ninth
Circuit has applied that standard to a variety of federal statutes where
the “plaintiff has served the public interest.”141 For example, in a prior
decision, it held that “provisions in environmental statutes with similar
language and purpose as the attorney’s fees provision in the Civil Rights
Act should be interpreted the same way.”142
In this case, the court concluded that “appropriate” in the CWA
should therefore be interpreted in the same way as in the attorney fees
provision of the Civil Rights Act.143 Thus, a district court has limited
plaintiff “was able to show that [defendant] was liable for civil penalties [since] . . . [c]ivil
penalties are an integral part of the enforcement scheme of [the CWA]”).
139
See, e.g., Friends of Warm Mineral Springs v. McCarthy, No. 8:13-cv-3236-T-23TGW,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98381, at *1–6 (M.D. Fla. July 28, 2015) (holding although
defendant was prevailing party, there was good cause to deny defendant’s motion for
attorney fees when “plaintiff’s argument, although ultimately unsuccessful, was neither
unreasonable nor groundless”); Fla. Wildlife Fed’n, Inc. v. McCarthy, No. 4:08cv324RH/CAS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190998, at *9–10 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2014) (finding good
cause to deny plaintiffs’ fee award when plaintiffs’ unrelated lawsuit was consolidated
with CWA suit, plaintiffs only made marginal contributions to success of suit, and there
was no evidence that the plaintiffs’ “participation in [the] litigation had anything to do
with inducing the [defendant] to act”).
140
St. John’s Organic Farm v. Gem Cnty. Mosquito Abatement Dist., 574 F.3d 1054, 1062
(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)).
141
Id. (citations omitted).
142
Id. at 1063 (quoting Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 182 F.3d 1091, 1095 (9th Cir. 1999)).
143
Id.
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discretion and may only deny attorney’s fees to a prevailing plaintiff under
the CWA if there are “special circumstances.”144
Since St. John’s Organic Farm, district courts within the Ninth
Circuit have frequently applied this “special circumstances” standard.145
Under this standard, a district court may deny fees to a plaintiff who:
“fail[s] to adequately brief the issues,” accepts a nuisance settlement,
tailors a fee request to over-represent the success of the suit, or forces the
court “to engage in independent research.”146 However, “special circumstances” do not include a party’s financial interest in the outcome of a case,
the fact that the defendant did not anticipate having to pay fees, or that a
party “would be the primary beneficiary of its success in the litigation.147
Additionally, district courts in the Ninth Circuit may apply a lower
threshold for “prevailing or substantially prevailing party” status than
other circuits.148 For example, in Resurrection Bay Conservation Alliance,
the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of a fee award to the
plaintiff in large part because, although the plaintiff only received a onedollar nominal fee, the plaintiff nevertheless caused the defendant to
obtain a permit.149 Other district courts in this circuit have similarly
granted fees despite limited success.150 However, district courts within
this circuit may still require “judicial enforceability” to determine that
a party is prevailing.151
3.

Analysis of Approach Three

The Eleventh Circuit seems to have solved the Fourth Circuit’s
dilemma by focusing on the goals of the CWA and explicitly embracing
144

Id. at 1003–04.
See, e.g., Idaho Conservation League & N.W. Env’t Def. Ctr. v. Atlanta Gold Corp.,
No.: 1:11-cv-161-REB, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182778, at *12 (D. Idaho Sept. 30, 2020)
(awarding fees to plaintiff appropriate because “no special circumstances . . . would render
an award of litigation expenses unjust”).
146
See Resurrection Bay Conservation All. v. City of Seward, 640 F.3d 1087, 1092–93 (9th
Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
147
See id. at 1092 (citation omitted).
148
See id. at 1091, 1093–94.
149
Id.
150
See, e.g., San Francisco Baykeeper v. W. Bay Sanitary Dist., No. C-09-5676 EMC, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138093, at *17–19 (N.D. Ca. Dec. 1, 2011) (holding limited success not
relevant to special circumstances determination); Puget Soundkeeper All. v. Rainier
Petroleum Corp., No. C14-0829JLR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 208663, at *37 (W.D. Wash.
Dec. 19, 2017) (awarding fees despite plaintiff only achieving limited success).
151
See Idaho Power Co. v. EPA, No. 1:18-cv-00255-BLW, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206787,
at *5 (D. Idaho Nov. 3, 2020).
145
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a modified version of the catalyst theory.152 Although only allowing a district court to deny costs and fees upon a showing of “good cause” has the
potential to allow for superfluous parties, in practice, district courts have
applied this standard with the goals of the CWA in mind.153 By encouraging plaintiffs to orient their claims around the goals of the CWA and to
seek relief based on furthering those goals, this standard also has the
potential to curb abusive litigation.154
The Ninth Circuit, however, by tying CWA litigation to the Civil
Rights Act and allowing district courts to only deny costs and fees in
“special circumstances,” seems to have gone further than other circuits
in encouraging citizen participation.155 However, though this approach
may allow citizens to file suit with more confidence because they have a
greater chance of winning cost and fee awards, unlike the “good cause”
standard, this approach does not explicitly tie a plaintiff’s success to advancing the goals of the CWA.156 Thus, it may be less adept at weeding
out superfluous or abusive parties.157
IV.

THE NEED FOR A MORE UNIFORM APPROACH

A.

Policy Considerations Regarding Costs/Fees

On one hand, greater restrictions on the availability of CWA fee
awards makes citizen lawsuits more risky, and this may seriously threaten
Congress’s goal of promoting public service.158 First, more restrictions
create fewer incentives for a law firm to take a citizen’s case and place a
higher burden on non-profit law firms, which may have limited resources.159
Second, greater restrictions amplify the inequalities between impoverished
152

See generally City of Mt. Park, Ga. v. Lakeside at Ansley, LLC, No. 1:05-CV-2775-CAP,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162205, at *13–14 (N.D. Ga. July 21, 2011).
153
See, e.g., id. (finding good cause to deny prevailing plaintiff’s attorney fees when plaintiff’s actions “actually thwarted the underlying goals of the CWA” and “plaintiff’s goal in
th[e] lawsuit was in great part for monetary profit rather than the advancement of the goals
of the CWA”).
154
See generally id.
155
See Mary Cile Glover-Rogers, Note, Who’s Footing the Bill for the Attorneys’ Fees?: An
Examination of the Policy Underlying the Clean Water Act’s Citizen Suit Provision, 18 MO.
ENV’T L. POL’Y REV., 64, 81–82 (2010).
156
See generally id.; Lakeside, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162205, at *13–14.
157
See generally Glover-Rogers, supra note 155, at 81–82.
158
Lincoln L. Davies, Lessons for an Endangered Movement: What a Historical Juxtaposition
of the Legal Response to Civil Rights and Environmentalism Has to Teach Environmentalists
Today, 31 ENV’T L. 229, 319 (2001).
159
Id.
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communities, already facing a disproportionate amount of pollution with
little to no resources to protect themselves, and privileged communities
that can afford to run the risk of bringing suit.160 Ultimately, this may lead
to a higher burden on government enforcement agencies, and, because
those agencies may not have the resources to haul every polluter into
court, this creates a greater chance that polluters will go unpunished.161
On the other hand, current trends in CWA citizen-suit litigation
may warrant certain restrictions.162 In 2017, then–EPA Administrator
Scott Pruitt issued a directive to end the EPA’s practice of “sue and settle,”
whereby the EPA would settle citizens’ claims against it behind closed
doors, which allowed citizens to change EPA policies without state or community participation.163 As part of this new directive, the Administrator
expressly excluded fee and cost awards in EPA settlements.164 One result
of this directive is an increase in citizen-suits against private companies,
as it is now more difficult and risky for citizens to attempt to enact environmental change through suing the EPA directly.165 This increase in citizensuits against private companies creates a greater concern that some
citizens will attempt to abuse the citizen-suit provision by bullying companies into reaching settlements.166 If courts are too lenient with their
fee and cost awards, then a company may just give in to these bullies
rather than risk having to pay costs and fees were it to lose in court.167 In
this way, freehanded awards may undermine Congress’s goal of preventing frivolous litigation.168
B.

Benefits and Detriments of Three Categories of Approaches

Without specific data regarding the number of successful citizensuits within each circuit, it may be difficult to determine which of the
160
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three categories of approaches has been most favorable for citizen plaintiffs or most successful at discouraging frivolous litigation.169 However,
one may nevertheless determine how well these approaches line up with
Congress’s original objectives regarding the CWA citizen-suit.170
As stated at the beginning of this Note, the primary goal of the
CWA is to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”171 The inclusion of a citizen-suit provision
was meant to further this goal by allowing citizens to participate in ensuring that the EPA’s regulations are enforced.172 By bringing legitimate
claims, citizens may help make their individual communities, and the Nation as a whole, a safer, healthier place in which to live. An attractive feeshifting provision is necessary to encourage such claims because many of
the biggest polluters are also some the most powerful companies in the
United States.173 Additionally, because private citizens are likely unfamiliar
with the complex nature of environmental suits, they must rely on skilled
lawyers and NGOs to fight their battles, which requires a lot of money.174
Congress initially gave courts expansive discretion in awarding
fees so that courts could exclude frivolous or harassing plaintiffs from
winning fees, vindicate claims that were in the public interest, and grant
awards to plaintiffs whose “actions . . . result[ed] in successful abatement
but do not reach a verdict.”175 However, after Ruckelshaus, Congress limited
the fee award to “prevailing or substantially prevailing parties” in order
to avoid unfair results, such as a superfluous party who intervened but
“fail[ed] to make a substantial contribution to the successful outcome of
the case.”176
The First and Third Circuits’ emphasis on allowing their lower
courts to freely exercise discretion may leave room for district courts to
make fact- and party-specific determinations.177 While these courts may
base their decisions on whether the plaintiff has demonstrated public
service by bringing suit, they are not required to do so.178 This may leave
169
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room for a good-faith plaintiff to get stuck paying the tab for attempting to
enforce the CWA.179 Additionally, it allows variation between district
courts, which may make the prospect of bringing a citizen-suit seem like
a gamble.180 Thus, this lack of uniformity may stifle public service under
the CWA.
The Eight Circuit’s broad discretion approach creates a similar
risk for plaintiffs.181 Furthermore, its explicit rejection of the catalyst
theory adds an even higher level of uncertainty, as a plaintiff may have
to pay his own way despite prompting positive environmental change.182
The Fourth Circuit’s goal-oriented approach may be on the right
track.183 Requiring plaintiffs to structure their claims around the goals
of the CWA likely encourages good faith claimants, rewards deserving
plaintiffs, and helps prevent citizens from misusing the citizen-suit provision. However, by failing to resolve whether the catalyst theory applies,
that circuit has allowed for division amongst its lower courts.184 Although
this may provide district courts with greater flexibility, it may also lead
to contradictory holdings.185 Indeed, the idea that one’s fee award depends on which particular judge decides the case makes the prospect of
bringing a citizen-suit look more like a night at the casino than an act of
public service. Although the Second Circuit’s focus on success allows for
more uniformity, it also creates unpredictability for a potential deserving
plaintiff, who may be robbed of her award by a defendant’s sudden
voluntary compliance.186
The final category of approaches limiting lower court discretion
may be better suited to fulfill Congress’s objective of promoting public
service.187 Limiting the instances in which a court may deny fees likely
makes CWA litigation more reliable and encourages plaintiffs to bring
good faith claims.188 However, this may also open the door to a greater
number of superfluous claimants.
The Eleventh Circuit’s explicit focus on the goals of the CWA and
tying the plaintiff’s success to those goals may help to solve this problem
179
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by discouraging weak or nefarious claimants from abusing the citizensuit provision.189 Rather than playing the odds, plaintiffs who bring suits
in the Eleventh Circuit can tailor their claims to the purposes of the CWA
and, if they win, be fairly confident that they will not have to pay for their
own public service.190 The Ninth Circuit’s “special circumstances” standard
is even more plaintiff-friendly, but, without tying the plaintiff’s success
to the goals of the CWA, this approach has the potential to fail to fulfill
Congress’s second objective of excluding harassing or frivolous claims.191
C.

Proposal for a More Uniform Standard

Our rivers continue to burn, and public service by private individuals and NGOs may be the only way to truly put out the flames. The
CWA citizen-suit is a powerful tool that can give government agencies
much-needed resources, promote positive policy changes, increase environmental vigilance, and force wrongdoers to pay the price for damaging
the environment.192 However, this tool cannot be effective unless citizens
and NGOs have a financial incentive.193 Thus, a workable fee-shifting provision may be crucial to “restor[ing] and maintain[ing] the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”194
District courts are likely best suited to decide when awarding or
denying fees and costs is appropriate, and, as such, they should have
room to exercise their discretion. However, it is crucial that they have
clear standards by which to exercise that discretion. Considering that the
purpose of the citizen-suit provision is to enforce the CWA, circuit courts
should develop standards that ensure that their lower courts’ discretion
is centered around the goals of the CWA.
Additionally, in light of Congress’s ultimate goal of encouraging
public service and the need for financial incentives to do this, these
standards must not be too restrictive for plaintiffs bringing good faith
claims. Despite adding the “prevailing or substantially prevailing” language to exclude free riders from benefitting from the citizen-suit, Congress did not intend to discourage citizens from public service.195 Given
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the environmental threats facing nearly every aspect of our Nation’s
waters, this public service is greatly needed.196 Thus, because the Supreme Court has not explicitly ruled that the catalyst theory does not
apply to the CWA, courts should be allowed to apply it when necessary,
so that deserving plaintiffs are not punished for prompting positive
environmental change.
However, district courts must still have the tools to exclude
abusive litigants from cost and fee awards.197 Again, a standard oriented
around the goals of the CWA and the plaintiff’s public service may be a
viable safeguard against frivolous or harassing plaintiffs.
The Eleventh Circuit may be a good example for other circuits to
198
follow. Other circuits should adopt clearer standards that allow for
greater uniformity among their lower courts. Like the Eleventh Circuit’s
approach, these standards should consider both whether the plaintiff, by
bringing her claim, was pursuing the goals of the CWA and whether the
plaintiff’s action furthered those goals, regardless of whether the positive
change resulted from judicial enforcement or voluntary compliance. At
the very least, circuits like the Fourth should make a definitive decision
regarding the catalyst theory so that plaintiffs at least know what to
expect prior to bringing suit.199
CONCLUSION
Considering the environmental crises we continue to face today200
and the often limited resources available to government agencies,201 more
citizens need to participate in enforcing the CWA. However, greater
participation requires a predictable, inclusive, and incentivizing feeshifting provision. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has passed down
vague guidance, and many circuit courts have done the same.202 This
needs to change. While some circuits are on the right track, their lack of
196
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consistency breeds risk and uncertainty, which may ultimately undermine Congress’s purpose regarding the CWA citizen-suit.203 Until the
Supreme Court clarifies this issue, it is up to circuit courts to take action,
speak clearly, and ensure their lower courts have sufficient standards to
guide their discretion. Perhaps an approach like the Eleventh Circuit has
taken may be a viable example for other circuits to follow.204 Although the
Supreme Court may have muddied the waters, now is as good a time as
any for circuits to clean things up.
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